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INTRODUCTION 
 Dale Carpenter’s book, Flagrant Conduct,1 details the development of the landmark case, 
Lawrence v. Texas,
2
 from the arrests of John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner for their violation of a 
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual conduct,
3
 to the monumental United States Supreme 
Court decision that held the statute unconstitutional in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
4
  
This decision by the Court overturned their five-to-four decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, less 
than two decades earlier, that a Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of 
homosexuals.
5
 
 The Supreme Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence demonstrates a policy of deciding 
civil rights issues only after the political climate of the nation has clearly indicated a fundamental 
shift in support of the relevant issue.  This literary review argues that, in accordance with 
Carpenter’s theory, a comprehensive shift in America’s collective attitude toward sexuality is a 
strong indication that the Court will soon subject classifications based on sexual orientation to 
heightened scrutiny in order for relevant laws to pass constitutional muster.  The Court granted 
certiorari in two cases on the same day in December 2012—Hollingsworth v. Perry6 and United 
States v. Windsor
7—both present the opportunity for the Court to finish what it started in 
Lawrence, and firmly secure the right of homosexuals to equal protection of the laws. 
 The Windsor case challenges the validity of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA),
8
 and Hollingsworth opposes the legitimacy of a voter-enacted amendment of 
                                                        
1
 DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: HOW A BEDROOM ARREST 
DECRIMINALIZED GAY AMERICANS (2012). 
2
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
3
 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(A) (2003). 
4
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585. 
5
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
6
 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 12-144  (Dec. 12, 2012). 
7
 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-307 (Dec. 12, 2012). 
8
 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), 
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California’s constitution that restricts the state’s recognition of marriage to only those “between 
a man and a woman.”9  The stakes are high, if the Court invalidates DOMA or Proposition 8 as 
unconstitutional under a heightened scrutiny standard.  Either decision, depending on the depth 
of the Court’s analysis, may result in the invalidation of all state and federal laws that prohibit 
marriage equality; the widespread effect would be parallel to the Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, where Kansas’s segregation of schools was found unconstitutional therein 
resulting in desegregation of schools across the nation.   
 This analysis proceeds in three parts.  The first part provides the little known factual 
background of Lawrence provided in Flagrant Conduct, as well as the book’s discussion of the 
litigation strategy in that case as it bolsters this paper’s position given the Court should clearly 
establish the applicability of a heightened scrutiny where legal classifications are based on sexual 
orientation.  The second part discusses the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence 
concerning the development of heightened scrutiny analysis.  Part Two also sets forth a history 
of the Court’s landmark equal protection cases with respect to classifications based on sexual 
orientation.  Finally, Part Three arrives at the conclusion that it is the Court’s duty to employ 
heightened scrutiny to classifications made on the basis of sexual orientation based on the legal 
and social developments relevant to the issue. 
I. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence provides only that police arrived at the 
apartment of John Lawrence in September 1998 in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
10
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008). 
9
 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. 
2012); see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “the word ‘marriage’ [to] mean[] only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ [to] refer[] only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife”). 
10
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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Upon arriving, police found Lawrence and Garner engaged in a sexual act in violation of Texas’s 
homosexual conduct law, resulting in their arrests.
11
 
 Carpenter begins Flagrant Conduct with a brief discussion of the history of the societal 
condemnation of sodomy commencing from the very beginning of American settlement.  One 
account discovered in the diary of Reverend Francis Higgeson, dating back to an immigrant 
voyage of 1629, revealed that upon arriving in Massachusetts, five boys who confessed to having 
engaged in sexual “wickedness” during their voyage were sent back to England for their 
punishment—at the time, as the Massachusetts official was surely aware, sodomy was 
punishable in England by hanging.
12
  This zero-tolerance policy of mother England seems to be 
the foundation of all state laws condemning homosexual conduct through the nineteenth century 
and well into the twentieth century through the prohibition of anal sex.
13
   
 Carpenter notes that pre-Civil War sodomy laws were especially vague because the crime 
was too abhorrent for the spoken work, considered “not fit to be named.”14  Simultaneous with 
the rapid industrialization of the time, homosexual subcultures existed in New York, San 
Francisco, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Chicago Boston, New Orleans, and Washington D.C.; 
resulting in more aggressive laws regulating sexuality.
15
  It was not uncommon for such laws to 
call for the callous penalty of sterilization or castration of the convicted.
16
  In a corresponding 
effort to eradicate homosexuality medical institutions performed extreme medical procedures 
                                                        
11
 Id. at 563. 
12
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 71 (citing FRANCIS HIGGESON’S JOURNAL, in THE FOUNDING OF MASSACHUSETTS 
(Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1930) (entry of June 29, 1629). 
13
 Id. at 4 (also prohibiting oral sex). 
14
 Id. at 5 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 6. 
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including prefrontal lobotomies, the injection of mass doses of male hormones, and 
administration of electric shock therapy.
17
   
 At the same time, federal authorities took a comprehensive approach to suppressing 
homosexuality by seizing and destroying publications and films it deemed obscene, excluding 
immigrants convicted of sexual crimes, barring military service by those considered degenerates, 
and cracking down on the spread of communism in part because of the public belief that it was 
linked to deviant sexuality.
18
   
 The anti-homosexual fervor reached a head between 1941 and 1961, arrests for violations 
of state sodomy laws were at their peak, and at all levels of government, criminal penalties were 
imposed on as many as one million lesbian and gay men who engaged in consensual adult 
intercourse, and even acts of affection including dancing, kissing, and hand holding.
19
 
 Law enforcement officials were utilizing both direct and indirect methods to shut down 
community establishments known to be gay.
20
  Regulatory systems, such as business and liquor-
license schemes, represented one of the indirect mechanisms by which these unwanted business 
were barred from operation.
21
  Specifically, a 1954 ordinance passed by Miami mandated 
discrimination by private proprietors by prohibiting bar owners from knowingly allowing two or 
more persons who were homosexuals, lesbians or perverts to congregate or remain in the place of 
business.
22
  This ordinance had the effect of closing all of Miami’s gay bars by 1960. 23  
Similarly, the Liquor Authority of New York State, among other states, prohibited bars from 
                                                        
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. at 7. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. 
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serving prostitutes and homosexuals.
24
  Moreover, state efforts to target homosexuals through 
legislation were bolstered by their respective law enforcement officials by way of police 
stakeouts at suspected gay bars, decoy operations, and police raids to arrest large numbers of 
socializing homosexuals.
25
 
 Homosexual citizens responded to these attacks by political organization in the form of 
gay-rights groups such as the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis, formed in the 
1950s.
26
  Naturally, the Federal Bureau of Investigations closely monitored these gay-rights 
groups, further increasing the social disapprobation.
27
   
 With respect to Texas, at first, its anti-sodomy law was unenforceable as the courts 
refused to affirm convictions under the statute due to a separate law requiring that criminal 
offenses be “expressly defined.”28  Accordingly, outlawing the “crime against nature” did not 
satisfy the express standard under the law.
29
  During this period of influx, Texas courts held that 
the anti-sodomy law applied equally to heterosexual activity.
30
   
 In 1943, the anti-sodomy law was revised by the state legislature explicitly making oral 
sex a crime for the first time in Texas.
31
  Under the revision, the statute suggested that while oral 
sex for the purpose of “carnal copulation” was illegal, oral sex for some other purpose was 
acceptable.
32
  Interestingly, while sexual intercourse with an animal was prohibited, oral sex with 
an animal was not illegal because the statute only forbade oral sex performed on “another human 
being.” 
                                                        
24
 Id. 
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 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 7. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 9. 
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30
 Id. 
31
 Id. at 10. 
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 Id. 
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 By the 1960s the nation’s landscape with respect to privacy rights had undergone a 
significant change.  These developments would set the foundation for the Lawrence brief.  In the 
1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that the “right to privacy” protects the 
marital bedroom from police intrusion.
33
  Less than a decade after this decision, the right to 
privacy was extended to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
34
  This shift was reflected in 
the Model Penal Code of 1955 (MPC), which in relevant part, urged the states to do away with or 
modify antiquated sex laws concerning subjects like adultery, fornication, bestiality, seduction, 
and sodomy.   
 The first of the states to accept the suggested changes of the MPC was Illinois in 1961.  
Following suit, in 1973, the Texas legislature revised its criminal laws liberalizing many of its 
sex laws.  This comprehensive revision effected the decriminalization of adultery, fornication, 
seduction, and even bestiality.
35
  Carpenter suggests that this change reflects the Texas 
legislature’s understanding that the Supreme Court’s decisions constrained the government’s 
power to control human sexuality.  Importantly, in 1970, a Dallas federal court held that the state 
sodomy law was unconstitutional in its application to married couples; however, the judgment 
was ultimately vacated.
36
   
 The national trend and court decisions on the issue did not persuade the Texas legislature 
to stay out of the bedrooms of homosexuals.  In fact, the visible advancement of the gay-rights 
movement resulted in a backlash in Austin.  As laws concerning the sexual conduct of 
heterosexuals, married or unmarried, procreative or non-procreative, were progressively 
becoming more liberal, the legislature maintained its codification of homosexual intolerance.  
                                                        
33
 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
34
 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
35
  CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 11. 
36
 Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 
(1971). 
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The new law defined “deviate sexual intercourse” as “any contact between any port of the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.”37  Although seemingly equal in 
its application, a corresponding “Homosexual Conduct” provision clarified that these acts were a 
crime only if performed “with another individual of the same sex,” thus, heterosexual sodomy 
was legal in the state.
38
  In fact, the scope of homosexual prohibition expanded, for the first time 
the law proscribed lesbian sex.
39
 
 Thus, while the 1973 liberalization of Texas Homosexual Conduct law marked the 
expansion of the types of sexual acts traditionally proscribed under sodomy laws, at the same 
time, the legislature expressly proscribed both oral and anal sex only if performed by 
homosexuals.  The absurdity of this legislative development is best underscored by the fact that 
after the statute’s enactment in 1973, it was legal to have sex with an animal, but not with 
another person of the same sex.
40
 
 Gay-rights supporters had made countless attempts to challenge the Texas statute as 
unconstitutional under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, but were unsuccessful either 
because of technical reasons or courts’ rulings that the law was constitutional.41  Notably, in 
1985, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the statute was constitutional under 
equal protection of the laws, which was a reversal of a decision by a lower court.
42
  And although 
two state appeals court decisions in the early 1990s provided a victory for homosexuals who 
were discriminated against by their employer because of their sexual orientation, the Texas 
Supreme Court held that any challenge to the statute must be made through the state’s criminal 
                                                        
37
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 11. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id.at 12. 
41
 Id. at 13. 
42
 Id. 
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courts.  Thus, the statute could not be challenged until the arrest and prosecution of two 
consensual adults for having sex in private. 
 Interestingly, Carpenter’s research revealed that in the 143-year life of the Texas sodomy 
law, there were no publicly reported court decisions involving the enforcement of the law against 
consensual sex between adult persons in a private space.  The published Texas court decisions 
concerning the issue of sodomy contained some element that distinguished each of those cases 
from Lawrence – many concerned a non-private place, some involved force or coercion, others 
involved minors.  Yet, as Carpenters points out, “the absence of published decisions does not 
mean that the Texas sodomy law was never enforced against private activity.”43 
 Carpenter points out that the development of the statute demonstrates that as was the case 
for similar laws around the country the law originally applied to certain acts regardless of the sex 
of the people involved.
44
  Yet the statute evolved in such a way that it targeted a narrow type of 
people who engaged in certain acts.  Thus, the statute stood for the codification of the cultural 
assumption that homosexuals were hyper-sexualized and dangerous.   
 All of the relevant players in the background facts of Lawrence – defendants, activists, 
and sheriff’s deputies – were raised in Houston.45  Carpenter discusses the history of Houston’s 
gay men and lesbians in the years preceding Lawrence in order to illustrate the mutual “distrust 
and antagonism between the city’s gay population and police.”46  
   Dating back to the 1920s, there existed bars in Houston that served a mostly 
homosexual clientele.  Obviously, their existence and location was known by word of mouth.  
These bars were practically the only private place that homosexuals could gather.  As these 
                                                        
43
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
44
 Id. at 16. 
45
 Id. at 18. 
46
 Id. at 19. 
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private bars were a place where members of the gay community could discuss gay life, they are 
considered the precursors to today’s gay-rights political organizations.   
 However, attendance at any of these gay bars came with considerable risk.  First, walking 
into one of these bars, if seen by the public, constituted a confession of one’s sexuality.  Second, 
there was the fear of being harmed by someone at the bar because during the 1940s and 1950s 
there were men known in the gay subculture as “dirt” who would rob and blackmail men at gay 
bars.  In some instances, “dirt” would “drop a nickel on a sister,” which would involve a person 
calling the employer of a gay acquaintance to inform the employer of their employee’s 
homosexuality.  The object was to get the person fired and then apply take his or her job.
47
  
Third, there was fear of a police raid.  Houston police regularly raided gay bars from the 1950s 
through the mid-1980s, as did law enforcement officials in states around the country.  Even 
private homes were subject to similar raids. 
 Gay bars and social life began to undergo comparative prosperity in 1960s.
48
  There were 
dozens of gay bars in Houston, yet police still represented a legitimate fear of in their attempts to 
combat the community’s success.  This type of animus was even reflected in the private sector as 
demonstrated by the acts of a Houston businessman who controlled a prominent bank and 
founded a highly reputable law firm.  The man hired a private detective to visit gay bars and 
record the license plates of nearby parked cars.  Once recorded, the plates were checked against 
his employees’ license plates, firing those that matched.49             
 During the late 1960s, Houston’s gay community began forming gay political 
organizations in a response to police harassment.  The roots of this movement began with the 
organizational efforts of Ray Hill, David Patterson, and Rita Wanstrom in 1967.  From their 
                                                        
47
 Id. at 20. 
48
 Id. at 21. 
49
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 21. 
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efforts came the lesbian group, Tumblebugs, and a gay group, the Promethean Society.
50
  The 
organizational efforts were secretive requiring leafleting cars parked near gay bars.
51
  Because of 
this constraint, continuity among the groups was compromised resulting in the hampering of 
group discussions. 
 Around the same time that Houston movement was taking off, New York City was the 
site of a landmark moment in gay rights.  On June 27, 1969 police raided a gay bard known as 
the Stonewall Inn.
52
  After the raid, a riot ensued by the bar patrons who were joined on the 
streets by members of the public.  The people set fries defiant chants were coupled by their 
hurling of rocks and bottles at police.  Even further unrest was displayed the following night, but 
all the while inspiring homosexuals across the country.
53
   
 In Houston, one year after the Stonewall Inn riots, a local chapter of Integrity, a gay 
religious group, was formed.  Pursuant to a priest’s permission, the chapter held its meetings at 
Holy Rosary Church.  The chapter’s founders were a group of gay men who described the group 
as a “fellowship of homophiles.”54  The group formed Houston’s first gay speakers bureau and 
the first gay clinic to diagnose and treat venereal diseases.
55
  Additionally, the group supported 
political candidates responsible for the election of Fred Hofheinz to mayor in 1973.  Moreover, 
the groups’ leaders were the first to appear before the city council supporting gay causes, and the 
core of the founders of the Gay Political Caucus.   
 The summer of 1971, like those prior, brought with it raids on local gay bars resulting in 
their destruction by Houston police.  Fuel to the fire was added by the events surrounding the 
                                                        
50
 Id. at 22. 
51
 Id.  
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id.  
55
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 23. 
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Houston Candy Man murders.  For three years between 1970 and 1973, Dean Corll used his 
mother’s candy business to abduct, rape, and murder twenty-seven young men in Houston.  
Police authorities discovered that Corll’s method was first to incapacitate his victims with 
alcohol or deceived them into putting on handcuffs.  Next, he would strip the victims naked, tie 
them to a board, torture, and sexually assault them.  He then would either strangle or shoot his 
victims dead.
56
 Croll would wrap the dead bodies in plastic sheets and discard them around 
Houston.  This morbid story was circulated by the press and faned the flames of those who 
believed that homosexuals were mentally ill, predatory, and a threat to children everywhere. 
 Yet, the struggle for gay rights continued in Houston.  On June 19, 1984 the city council 
passed two ordinances prohibiting discrimination against gay people in city employment.  This 
called for inserting a provision to include “sexual orientation” to sections of the civil service 
code.
57
  On January 19, 1985, a referendum was held calling for the repeal of the ordinances.
58
  
The result of the referendum was the rejection of both ordinances by a 40% margin.
59
   
 John Geddes Lawrence was born to a devout family of Southern Baptists in Beaumont, 
Texas.
60
  His parents divorced when he was six years old, and this father died when he was 
eleven.  Lawrence was primarily raised by his grandmother.  He served in the Navy for five 
years beginning in 1960.  At one point, he had a marriage to a woman he met in the Navy, but it 
ended in divorce due to the absence of “physical attraction.”  Lawrence had various sexual 
relationships with several other men during his Naval service. 
                                                        
56
 Id. at 24. 
57
 Id. at 28. 
58
 Id. at 33. 
59
 Id. at 35. 
60
 Id. at 42. 
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 Lawrence moved into the Colorado Club Apartments of East Houston in 1978.
61
  
Beginning in the late 1980s, Lawrence worked as a medical technologist at a nearby hospital.
62
  
And although Lawrence presented himself as an unassuming man, in 1967 he was found guilty 
of murder-by-automobile in Galveston County and sentenced to five years’ probation.63  And 
twice since that incident, he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. 
 Lawrence met Robert Eubanks in the mid-1970s.
64
  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Eubanks worked odd jobs and slept wherever he could find shelter.  He was described as a loud, 
volatile and a heavy drinker.  At one point, Lawrence and Eubanks shared an apartment with 
each other, but Lawrence moved out because trouble followed Eubanks wherever he went.  
Despite this, they remained good friends.   
 In 1990, Eubanks met Tyrone Garner, the man arrested with Lawrence on the night 
underlying Lawrence v. Texas.  Garner had nine siblings and was born into a traditional Baptist 
family.  Garner and his family had an impoverished upbringing. Garner did not go to college.   
Not surprisingly, he never even rented an apartment, instead he moved about from place to place 
staying with family members and friends.  Soon after meeting, Garner and Eubanks began dating 
and moved in together.
65
  In what was described as a relationship that was “tempestuous, to say 
the least.” 
 After meeting each other, Garner and Lawrence had not become anything more than 
acquaintances.  The three men occasionally went to diner, and about once a month, Garner and 
Eubanks traveled the twenty miles to Lawrence’s neighborhood to clean his home and run his 
errands in exchange for money.   
                                                        
61
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 43. 
62
 Id.  
63
 Id.  
64
 Id. at 44. 
65
 Id. at 45. 
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 At the outset, it should be noted that Lawrence’s apartment was not legally in Houston, 
but in an unincorporated area outside the city limits.
66
  As such, these locations fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”).  Records show that HSCO deputies 
fired on unarmed people with far more frequency than similar urban law enforcement agencies 
during the period 1999-2004.  One factor could be that other agencies had stricter use-of-force 
policies than did Harris County.
67
  Equally disconcerting is HSCO’s recorded treatment of 
minority groups.  In this respect, HSCO had an unusually high rate of complaints about racial 
bias, with such complaints receiving retaliation.  Moreover, within the years before Lawrence, 
almost all the leaders of the black officers’ league had been fired, demoted, or forced to resign.68  
 With respect to sexual orientation, there were no openly gay employees working for the 
HSCO in 2007.
69
  The department’s equal employment policy did not grant protection to 
homosexuals. 
 Four deputies from the HSCO responded to the scene that formed the backdrop of 
Lawrence.  The were on the scene responding to a call from their dispatcher informing them that 
there was potential gun violence at the home of John Lawrence.
70
  The deputies on the scene 
were Joseph Quinn, William Lilly, Donald Tipps, and Ken Landry.  Three of these men were 
interviewed by Carpenter in order to place Lawrence in context.  Landry did not respond to his 
interview request. 
 Quinn, as the first on the scene, was the lead officer in charge of making arrests and filing 
reports.  Quinn was recruited out of the army and began working at the county jail.  Quinn had 
quickly developed a reputation as a tough cop.  A county clerk who handled many of Quinn’s 
                                                        
66
 Id. at 46. 
67
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 47. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 48. 
70
 Id. at 49. 
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cases described him as “the worst nightmare I think anybody would ever come across.”  Justice 
of the Peace, Judge Parrott, whose precinct covered Quinn’s cases had similar descriptions of 
Quinn.  The justice described Quinn as an officer who would write kids tickets, “thrown them on 
the ground, handcuffed them, strip-searched them, and hailed them to jail in front of shocked 
parents and schoolchildren.”71 
 William Lilly was the only black man among the arresting deputies.
72
 Lilly along with 
Quinn was one of the two deputies who claimed to have seen Lawrence and Garner having sex.
73
  
Lilly was raised to a conservative Baptist family.  Following high school, he worked for the 
Texas Department of Corrections and for the Galveston County Sheriff’s Office.74  Carpenter 
noted that Lilly’s views on homosexuality were the most nuanced of the three deputies.  He 
admitted to having grown out of his homophobia, and believed that people were born gay. 
 In his interview, he stated that he opposed laws that criminalized private sex in the home 
and he opposed gay marriage, as did the other officers.  Also, Lilly did not believe that 
homosexuals should serve in the military out of fear that they would be unsafe.  Most 
interestingly, he was more tolerant of lesbians than homosexuals stating that it would be bad for 
society if male homosexuality were as accepted as being a lesbian.  Carpenter believes that 
Lilly’s greater acceptance of lesbianism is because of Lilly’s perceived danger of AIDS.75  
 Donnie Tipps, the son of an American soldier, was born in Germany.  Upon his mother’s 
decision that she could no longer care for Tipps and his three brothers, she gave them to Boys 
                                                        
71
 Id. at 50. 
72
 Id. at 54. 
73
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 54. 
74
 Id. at 55. 
75
 Id. at 56. 
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Country, a Houston organization.  He attended high school in Houston, after which he worked 
for a variety of auto supply and construction companies.
76
  
 During his employment in the department, Tipps was the subject of several internal 
affairs investigations.
77
  Tipps believed that homosexual activity should be prohibited even in the 
privacy of the home.  He supports this belief with references to the Bible.  Additionally, because 
doing drugs and killing is prohibited no matter where it takes place, homosexual conduct should 
not be afforded an exception.  He did not believe that homosexuals should have the right to 
marry.  He did, however, believe that homosexuals should serve in the military. 
 Ken Landry was born in Louisiana and graduated from a high school in Houston.
78
  He 
reached the rank of staff sergeant in the Army.  Quinn described him as a jokester.  Tipps 
described him as hardworking and smart. 
 Upon entering, the deputies conducted a search making their way to the back bedroom.  
Two of the officers reported seeing Lawrence and Garner having sex, in violation of the statute, 
in a bedroom located at the back of the apartment.  The reporting officers found no gun.  The 
deputies arrested the two men and gave them citations for violating the Texas sodomy statute.   
 One officer recollects that, with guns drawn, they had knocked on the apartment’s door in 
search of a man going crazy with a gun.  Quinn said he knocked on the door in such a way that it 
had the effect of pushing the door open.  He also stated that nobody was present in the apartment 
upon entering, the lights were off, and the apartment was quiet.  Upon entering, the deputies had 
split up into two groups of two.  One set made a left toward a bedroom, and the other set kept 
going forward finding a man on a telephone.  Quinn and his partner frisked the man and had him 
secured.  Quinn and his partner noticed a separate dimly lit bedroom in the distance.   
                                                        
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at 57. 
78
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 58. 
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 After Quinn’s partner got a glimpse of the bedroom, he lurched back.  In Quinn’s 
opinion, he thought that his partner had discovered the armed man.  Quinn then went around on 
the officer’s side and in a crouched position aimed his gun inside the room.  At that moment, 
seeing the men for the first time, Quinn claimed that he repeatedly told Lawrence and Garner to 
stop having sex, and that Lawrence, having made eye contact with Quinn, continued having sex.  
Quinn went on to say that as guns were drawn at Lawrence and Garner, the two deputies again 
ordered that the men cease having sex.  And, according to Quinn, Lawrence and Garner refused 
to comply. Quinn recollects that the entire scene went on for well in excess of one minute and 
would have continued had the deputies not pried Lawrence from Garner.   
 Carpenter makes clear that Quinn’s account of that night is unrealistic.  Notably, the other 
set of officers did not see this sequence of events.  It is also worth mentioning that Quinn and his 
partner did not agree on the type of sex that Lawrence and Garner had engaged in that night.   
 Lawrence and Garner had spent that night in the Harris County jail.  The violation was a 
class c misdemeanor carrying with it a $200 fine.  As they were not connected with the gay 
rights movement, the two men could not have understood their case’s potential.   
 Carpenter states that if not for Judge Parrott’s closeted clerk, Lawrence may never have 
seen the light of day.  Because upon seeing the report of the sodomy arrest and noticing that 
Quinn was the officer on the scene, the clerk had discussed the arrest with his partner – a local 
sheriff.  Later that night, the two were discussing the arrest at a local gay bar bartender who was 
a gay activist.  The activist-bartender quickly realized the magnitude of the case and eventually 
got in contact with Lambda legal.     
 Although Lawrence and Garner claim that they were not having sex or engaging in any 
form of intimate conduct that night, they pled guilty to allow a challenge for the underlying 
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injustice of the law, which was upheld by the Court in Bowers.  Because there was no trial, the 
only facts attorneys were left with were confined to the seventy-word complaint filed by Quinn 
on the night of the arrests.      
II. HISTORY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN EQUAL PROTECTION 
 Carpenter highlighted that by the end of 2002, across the nation, the “tides had changed” 
and the constitutional arguments of both due process and equal protection by the petitioners had 
been fine-tuned for submission to the Court.
79
  
 Before Lambda had filed its cert petition, there existed some hesitancy among gay-rights 
lawyers and legal scholars as to whether the Court would overrule Bowers.
80
  Notably, there was 
some doubt that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a member of the majority in Bowers, would 
reverse her own position in order to rule in favor of the petitioners in Lawrence.
81
  And among 
the dissenting Justices in Bowers, only Justice Paul Stevens remained on the Court in 2002.
82
   
 The biggest risk that gay-rights advocates faced in a potential case before the Court was 
that Bowers would be reaffirmed.
83
  In its determination as to whether a cert petition should be 
filed in their case, Lambda concluded that in light of the developments in society and the law 
since Bowers was decided in 1986, filing cert was worth the risk.
84
  
 The overarching theme of the case was that the United States had progressed far beyond 
the bigoted antigay affectation that the Texas sodomy law represented.
85
  The central thrust of 
                                                        
79
 Id. at 180. 
80
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81
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82
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83
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84
 CARPENTER, supra note 1, at 182. 
85
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their argument was that the Court was now “behind the times” because the nation had progressed 
since Bowers, and the vestiges of traditional state sodomy laws reflected outdated bigotry.
86
  
 Carpenter’s account of the Lambda team’s tactical approach stresses the relevance of 
public perception in the Supreme Court’s decision of constitutional issues.  Under this principle, 
the Court should clearly establish that laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 
such as both DOMA and Proposition 8, should be found unconstitutional under heightened 
scrutiny.    
A. EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 This section provides a general discussion of equal protection jurisprudence in order to 
provide insight concerning both the evolution of the Court’s analysis of equal protection claims, 
and the Court’s considerations when assigning levels of review to classifications.  
 Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed pursuant to both the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
87
  Because laws classify persons or groups in a 
manner that permits or denies certain benefits depending on the classification, the Court has 
established three primary levels of review in order to assess whether the classification withstands 
constitutional scrutiny.
88
   
 The most basic level of analysis is termed, rational basis review, which is highly 
deferential to almost all proffered government interests.
89
  When rational basis review is 
employed, the Court holds that a classification “must be upheld against equal protection 
                                                        
86
 Id. 
87
 The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection requirement applies to the federal government pursuant to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  Further, the Court’s 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is no different than that of the equal 
protection requirement of the Fifth Amendment.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). 
88
 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-21 (1982) (concluding that challenges under equal protection theory are assessed 
according to three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rational basis 
review). 
89
 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
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challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification.”90  In practice, the party alleging constitutional infringement bears the 
burden of disproving all conceivable rational bases for the classification, including any reasoning 
that had not originally been contemplated by the party defending the legislation.
91
  Rational basis 
review has been applied to laws that classify on the basis of age, socioeconomic status, and 
cognitive impairment.
92
   
 With respect to other classifications, the Court employs a more searching review, falling 
under the umbrella of “heightened scrutiny.”  Here, if the classification operates to discriminate 
against classes that have been held either “suspect” or “quasi-suspect,” the Court will employ 
either “strict” or “intermediate” levels of review, respectively.   
 “Strict scrutiny” has been employed to laws that classify on the basis of race, religion, 
and national origin,
93
 whereas “intermediate scrutiny” has been employed to classifications on 
the basis of gender and illegitimacy.
94
   
 To survive “strict scrutiny,” the government must demonstrate that the classification is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
95
  Under “intermediate scrutiny,” 
the government must demonstrate that the classification is substantially related to an important 
government objective.
96
   
                                                        
90
 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
91
 Id. at 313–15.  
92 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–42, 447 (applying rational basis review in the context of the cognitively 
impaired); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (applying rational basis review in the context 
of alienage); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20, 25 (1973) (applying rational basis 
review in the context of socioeconomic status). 
93
 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (national origin/alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
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 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender).  
95
 Craig, 429 U.S. at 216-17. 
96
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 Intermediate scrutiny review, albeit less demanding than “strict scrutiny,” requires that 
the government support its important objective by evidencing an “actual stated purposes, not 
rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded.”97   
 One line of precedent suggests that the Court applies a dispositive approach in 
determining suspect class status, where meeting any factor is sufficient to gain suspect class 
status.
98
  Yet, a separate line of precedent suggests that in the pursuit of obtaining suspect class 
status, the group must possess a common trait.
99
   
B. EQUAL PROTECTION: THE BACKDROP 
 The backdrop of modern day heightened scrutiny analysis was set in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., where, in relevant part, the issue before the Court was whether the 
review of a government law under the Equal Protection Clause required deference to the 
lawmaker.
100
  The Court noted that when a “discrete and insular minority,” has brought a 
constitutional challenge, a “more searching judicial inquiry”101 is required.   
 Although there was no discussion of the criteria necessary to constitute a “discrete and 
insular minority,” subsequent decisions such as Graham v. Richardson 102  and Bernal v. 
Fainter
103
 have shed light on the term.  Still, the Carolene Products Court did mention religious, 
                                                        
97
 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996). 
98
 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (suggesting that establishing any of the 
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purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”). 
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 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
100
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101
 Id. at 152 n.4. 
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103
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racial, and ethnic minorities when it touched upon the proposition of discrete and insular 
minorities.
104
   
 Almost five decades later, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, the 
Court, for the first time, used the term “suspect class” in holding that impoverished school 
districts cannot satisfy suspect class status because they were not “saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”105  
 That same year, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court augmented its equal protection 
review to include factors such as (i) whether the fact that members of the group share defining 
characteristics is relevant to its ability to contribute to society, and (i) the immutability of that 
defining characteristic.
106
  In Frontiero, the Court concluded that because sex is an immutable 
characteristic “determined solely by the accident of birth,”107  quasi-suspect class status was 
warranted.
108
   
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 The Court’s landmark equal protection cases regarding sexual orientation are Romer v. 
Evans
109
 and Lawrence v. Texas.
110
  The impact that these cases have had on equal protection 
litigation will be discussed, but first, it is necessary to illustrate the relevance of Bowers v. 
Hardwick.  
                                                        
104
 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
105
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 The Bowers Court held that homosexual sodomy was not encompassed by the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause.
111
  In relevant part, the Court expressed that the 
“respondent would have us announce...a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 
This we are quite unwilling to do.... Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our 
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.”112   
 The Court’s decision reversed the Eleventh Circuit holding and found that homosexual 
sodomy was not a fundamental right under the constitution, and that there was no historical 
recognition of a right to engage in sodomy in the United States.
113
  A decade later, the Court 
decided Romer v. Evans.
114
  
D. ROMER: EQUAL PROTECTION OF PUBLIC REFERENDUMS 
 In Romer, the Court held that Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution violated the 
Equal Protection Clause for its proscription of all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any 
level of government drafted to shield homosexuals from discrimination and prohibited the 
reinstatement of any such law or policy.
115
  
 While Romer was the first time that the Court encountered an equal protection challenge 
based on sexual orientation, the Court did not clearly identify the level of scrutiny to employ 
when reviewing sexual orientation based discrimination claims.
116
  Rather, the Court side-
stepped its assignment of any level of review and held that “[Colorado's] Amendment 2 fails, 
indeed defies, even [rational basis] inquiry.”117      
                                                        
111
 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
112 Id. at 191, 194. 
113
 Id. at 191-96. 
114
 Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
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 As a result of the Court’s unclear analysis, however, lower courts have interpreted Romer 
as establishing that when a law discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, rational basis 
review applies.
118
  
E. ENTER LAWRENCE: THE STEPPINGSTONE TO HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court expressly overruled Bowers as wrongly decided, and 
struck down the Texas statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy.
119
  The Court was presented 
with constitutional challenges under the clauses of both Due Process and Equal Protection.
120
  
The holding, however, was based on the implied right to privacy afforded by the Due Process 
Clause as it extends to consensual intimate conduct between adults.
121
 
 Lawrence provides that deciding on equal protection grounds was “tenable” and that 
“[w]ere [the Court] to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might 
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct 
both between same-sex and different-sex participants.”122  
 Episodically, the Court’s exercise of restraint may be most clearly explained by the 
political climate at the time the case was decided.  Other’s argue that the Court’s restraint may 
have been guided by other considerations.
123
     
 Regardless of the Court’s motivation, Lawrence stands not only for the decriminalization 
of class-behavior, but also for its contribution to the changing landscape of the nation.   
Lawrence is a necessary step before the Court can decide in favor of marriage equality, much 
                                                        
118
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119
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like the Court’s development from Griswold v. Connecticut124 to Eisenstadt v. Baird.125  In 
Griswold, the Court decriminalized contraceptive use by married couples under the Due Process 
Clause.
126
  Seven years subsequent to Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt held that the right to 
contraceptive use extends to unmarried couples.
127
  
 Although Lawrence was not a wholesale victory, the Court’s narrow decision was 
proportionate to the nation’s evolving perception of homosexuals.  At the time Lawrence was 
decided, the walls surrounding the Court’s holding appear to have been constructed by the 
political climate; one where the military’s “Don't Ask, Don't Tell”128 rule had effect, Congress 
had recently passed DOMA,
129
 and the legislative backlashes that took place in Alaska and 
Hawaii represented political unease with expanding homosexual rights.
130
  Moreover, speaking 
to the Court’s consideration of the political climate, when it overruled Bowers, the Lawrence 
Court stated that at the time Bowers was decided, a majority of states had already decriminalized 
homosexuality.
131
  
III. THE NEED FOR A COMPELLING INTEREST & A NARROWLY TAILORED APPROACH 
 Since the Lawrence
132
 decision, sexual orientation litigation has been compared to the 
civil rights movements concerning both racial
133
 and gender
134
 equality.  And while 
                                                        
124
 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
125
 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972). 
126
 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (discussing that certain rights have implied corollaries under the interest of liberty 
that expand their meaning beyond what is written in the constitution, and that marital privacy rights emanate from 
already recognized extensions of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). 
127
 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454 (concluding that “if Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of 
contraceptives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried 
but not married persons.”).  
128
 10 U.S.C.§654(b) (2000). 
129
 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. 7, 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000)). 
130
 ALASKA CONST. art. I, §25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man 
and one woman.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, §23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples.”). 
131
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73. 
132
 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
    
24 
 
classifications based on race and gender were initially widely justified by the nation’s majority, 
the Court’s decisions stood for the legal stamp of approval that did not come before a change in 
the nation.
135
   
A. THE EVOLVING COURT 
 The Court’s changing perception of homosexuals is of equal weight to that of the nation.  
The heightened scrutiny argument was first presented in the dissenting opinion of the denial of 
certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio.
136
  The 
petitioner, a nontenured high school guidance counselor (“counselor”), brought constitutional 
claims against the school district in connection with her suspension and transfer coupled with the 
nonrenewal of her employment contract.
137
   
 The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found in favor of the counselor, 
drawing support from unchallenged jury findings that the school district’s actions were based 
solely on the counselor’s bisexuality, and that her mentioning of her bisexuality did not “in any 
way interfere with the proper performance of [her or other school staff members’] duties or with 
the regular operation of the school generally.”138  Accordingly, the magistrate had ruled in favor 
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of the counselor’s constitutional claims under both the First Amendment’s right to free speech, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to equal protection of the laws.139 
 Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall, dissented to the Court’s denial of 
certiorari, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s reversal was based upon “a crabbed reading of our 
precedents and unexplained disregard of the jury and judge's factual findings.”140  In relevant 
part, the dissent suggested that the lower court’s decision was motivated by the avoidance of the 
issue of whether a State may dismiss an employee because of sexual orientation.
141
 
 Importantly, the dissent marks the first discussion of the application of heightened 
scrutiny when reviewing classifications based on sexual orientation.  The dissent pointed out that 
“in applying the Equal Protection Clause, ‘[the Court has] treated as presumptively invidious 
those classifications that disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a 
‘fundamental right.’”142  The facts of Rowland raised questions concerning suspect-class status 
and fundamental right impingement, which are the two prongs that trigger heightened scrutiny 
review under the Court’s “unsettled equal protection analysis.”143   
 In support of the first prong, the argument followed that homosexuals (i) “constitute a 
significant and insular minority of this country's population;”144 (ii) “are particularly politically 
powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena” in light “of the immediate and 
severe opprobrium often manifested against” them;145 and (iii) “have historically been the object 
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of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals 
is ‘likely ... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than ... rationality.’”146   Accordingly, “State 
action taken against members of such groups based simply on their status as members of the 
group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny by this Court.”147 
 In support of the second prong, the dissent drew support from the findings of other courts 
that discrimination based on sexual preference infringed the rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression.
148
  The argument also sought to extend San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,
149
 where the Court concluded that the infringement of rights that are “explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,”150 to the school district, requiring that demonstrate a 
compelling interest in order to survive strict scrutiny.
151
 
 Most importantly, Rowland acknowledged that “[w]hether constitutional rights are 
infringed in sexual preference cases, and whether some compelling state interest can be advanced 
                                                        
146
 Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216). 
147
 Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Justice Brennan dissenting) (footnoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (discrimination based on gender); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-23 (1982) 
(suggesting heightened scrutiny for discrimination against alien children); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 
(1977) (discrimination based on illegitimacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (discrimination based on 
race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (discrimination based on national origin). 
148
 Id. at 1015 (footnoting Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow 
homosexual student group equal access to state university facilities invalidated because infringement of First 
Amendment rights to expression and association not supported by any “substantial governmental interest”); Ben-
Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F.Supp. 964, 969, 973-77 (E.D. Wis.1980) (regulation requiring discharge 
based on homosexual “tendencies, desire, or interest, but ... without overt homosexual acts” held unconstitutional as 
violative of First and Ninth Amendment rights and right to privacy), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 
1987), New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (criminal statute 
prohibiting private homosexual conduct found to infringe constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection under 
“compelling state interest” test). See also Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1227, n. 7, 1228-29 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (noting “significant split of authority as to whether some private consensual homosexual behavior may 
have constitutional protection” but finding military's “compelling interest” in regulating homosexual conduct 
sufficient to uphold discharge based on false denial of homosexuality); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809-10 
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). But see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 
1388, 1395-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (naval discharge for homosexual conduct upheld as “rationally related” to 
permissible goals of the military; no constitutional right of privacy implicated). See generally KENNETH J. KARST, 
THE FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 682-86 (1980); SEXUAL PREFERENCE AND GENDER 
IDENTITY: A SYMPOSIUM, 30 Hastings L.J. 799-1181 (1979). 
149
 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
150
 Id. at 33-34. 
151
 Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1015. 
    
27 
 
to permit their infringement, are important questions that this Court has never addressed, and 
which have left the lower courts in some disarray.”152  
 Almost two decades later, concurring in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor put forth similar 
arguments regarding the need for the Court to establish heightened scrutiny when reviewing 
equal protection challenges based on sexual orientation.
153
   Justice O’Connor made clear that 
legislation motivated by “objectives, such as ‘a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group,’ are not legitimate state interests”154 and thus, do not survive rational basis scrutiny.155  
The Justice also noted the Texas legislature’s decision to criminalize only homosexual sodomy 
had the effect of discrimination in employment, family law, and housing.
156
 
B. INCONSISTENT COURT RULINGS 
 The Court has not provided any clear guidance concerning the level of equal protection 
analysis to employ when reviewing classifications based on sexual orientation.  The Court has 
avoided the issue even in the face of a direct equal protection challenge.
157
  The absence of clear 
direction has exacerbated the equal protection question by creating inconsistent review among 
the lower courts.  Despite Lawrence expressly overruling Bowers, lower courts relied on pre-
Lawrence precedent, drawing support from those cases that relied on Bowers rationale.
158
  Most 
notably, in In re Kandu, a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy court relied on High Tech Gays v. Defense 
Industrial Security Clearance Office, which held that rational basis review applied to a 
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constitutional challenge to DOMA
159
 because pursuant to Bowers, heightened scrutiny review is 
foreclosed as the U.S. Constitution affords no fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy.
160
   
 Even worse, courts have ruled that the holding in Romer provides that rational basis 
applies to laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
161
  However, as already 
discussed, the Romer Court did not reach the question of what level of scrutiny to apply, instead, 
the Court ruled that the Colorado ballot measure at issue “fail[ed], indeed defie[d],” even the 
rational basis inquiry, and avoided the question of what level of scrutiny applied.
162
  This is best 
evidenced by the Court’s remands in both Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. 
City of Cincinnati,
163
 which was remanded in light of Romer, and Limon v. Kansas,
164
 which was 
remanded in light of Lawrence.  The Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, 
Inc. concluded that “Romer supplied no rationale for subjecting a purely local measure of modest 
scope, which simply refused special privileges under local law for a non-suspect and non-quasi-
suspect group of citizens, to any equal protection assessment other than the traditional ‘rational 
relationship’ test.”165   
 In Limon, the Kansas court was presented with an equal protection challenge based on the 
state punishing consensual homosexual sodomy with a minor more severely than it did 
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heterosexual sodomy with a minor.
166
  On remand from the Supreme Court in light of Lawrence, 
the Kansas court distinguished Lawrence as ruling solely on due process analysis and therefore, 
inapplicable to the alleged equal protection challenge.
167
  
C. CHANGING CLIMATE 
 Marriage equality has gained significant support in recent years, which may be attributed 
to the nation’s change in its perception of homosexuals.168  The increasing support of expanding 
gay rights is also illustrated in recent court decisions and legislative action.  Among the most 
notable is Congress’ repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”169   
 The U.S. Executive branch showed its support of equal protection recognition on 
February 28, 2013 when the Obama administration filed an amicus brief in the Hollingsworth v. 
Perry.
170
  The brief argues that equal protection challenges to laws that discriminate based on 
sexual orientation, as Proposition 8 does, should require the Court to review the challenge under 
the heightened scrutiny standard because homosexuals satisfy the Court’s considerations under 
the standard.
171
  The Obama Administration’s argument, if employed by the Court, will have the 
effect of subjecting all subsequent state-level marriage equality cases to “heightened scrutiny.”   
 The Obama Administration’s brief in Perry is not the first time that the U.S. Government 
has weighed in on the equal protection issue.  Almost exactly two years prior, Attorney General, 
                                                        
166
 State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284 (Kan. 
May 25, 2004). 
167
 Limon, 83 P.3d at 235-36 (finding equal protection analysis “not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”).  
168
 " CNN Political Unit, CNN Poll: ‘Rob Portman effect’ Fuels Support for Same-Sex Marriage, CNN Politics 
(March 25, 2013), available at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/25/cnn-poll-rob-portman-effect-fuels-
support-for-same-sex-marriage/ (“The number of Americans who support same-sex marriage has risen by almost the 
same amount in that time - from 40% in 2007 to 53% today - strongly suggesting that the rise in support for gay 
marriage is due in part to the rising number of Americans who have become aware that someone close to them is 
gay[.]”). 
169
 Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
170
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, No. 12-144, 2013 WL 769326 (Feb. 28, 
2013) [hereinafter Obama Amicus]. 
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Eric H. Holder Jr., issued a memorandum to the John A. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, John A. Boehner, regarding the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) position 
on litigation involving the Defense Against Marriage Act (“DOMA”).172  Holder’s memorandum 
stands for the end of the DOJ’s defense of Section 3 of DOMA in cases involving traditional 
rational basis review of the statute’s constitutionality as it relates to legally married same-sex 
couples.  
 The litigation discussed in the memorandum concerned two lawsuits in the Second 
Circuit, Windsor v. United States
173
 and Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management.
174
  The 
Second Circuit has no precedent concerning the constitutional review of laws that discriminate 
based on sexual orientation.  Thus, upon direction from the Obama Administration, Holder, 
concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation should not be subject to traditional 
rational basis review but instead to “more heightened scrutiny.”175  Holder made clear (i) that the 
President’s conclusion that Section 3 of DOMA as applied to legally married same-sex couples, 
fails to meet that standard and is thus unconstitutional; (ii) that he would instruct DOJ attorneys 
to advise courts in other pending DOMA litigation that both he and the President have concluded 
that heightened scrutiny should be applied to such cases; (iii) that Section 3 is unconstitutional 
under heightened scrutiny analysis; and (iv) that the DOJ will no longer defend Section 3.
176
 
 The underlying principle behind the DOJ’s decision to cease defending Section 3 of 
DOMA is that “[m]uch of the legal landscape has changed in the 15 years since Congress passed 
DOMA.”  In support of this statement, Holder refers to (1) the Supreme Court’s finding that laws 
                                                        
172
 Letter of Att’y Gen. Holder to Speaker Boehner of the U.S. House of Rep. (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder 
Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.    
173
 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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 881 F.Supp.2d 294 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012). 
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criminalizing homosexual conduct are unconstitutional, (2) Congress’ decision to repeal the 
military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, and (3) federal court decisions striking down DOMA as 
unconstitutional.   
 The government’s position has persuaded some lower courts to follow suit.  In In re 
Balas,
177
 the Ninth Circuit, having previously applied rational basis review to a DOMA 
challenge pursuant to Bowers, applied the Court’s four considerations to determine whether 
homosexual classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny.
178
  
D. SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A CLEAR STANDARD 
 Months after Attorney General Holder’s memorandum was issued, the DOJ submitted a 
brief in Golinski v. United States Office of Personnel Management
179
 that fleshes out the DOJ’s 
arguments for heightened scrutiny review of DOMA challenges.
180
  The DOJ brief, in the context 
of DOMA, is a concise compilation of the modern arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny for 
the Court’s review of equal protection challenges based on sexual orientation classifications.  
The following are arguments supporting the application of heightened scrutiny to laws that 
classify on the basis of sexual orientation; primarily citing the brief submitted by the DOJ in 
Golinski. 
 The Supreme Court has expressed that certain classifications are much “more likely than 
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legitimate objective,”181 that their use triggers a more searching inquiry.  As discussed, the core 
of the Court’s equal protection analysis is both the level of scrutiny to be applied, and the status 
                                                        
177
 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
178
 Id. at 575-76 (finding that heightened scrutiny applied to equal protection challenges based on sexual orientation 
classifications because of both a history of discrimination, and the High Tech Gays decision itself.).  
179
 824 F.Supp.2d 968 (N.D. Cal. February  22, 2012).  
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 Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, Golinski v. Office of Personnel Management, No. C 
3:10-00257-JSW (9th Cir. July 1, 2011) [hereinafter Golinski DOJ Brief]. 
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of the classified group.  Yet, there is no clear standard as to the appropriate type of review in 
cases involving classifications based on sexual orientation.
182
   
  Although the Court has yet to establish the level of review for classifications based on 
sexual orientation, it has consistently found and held a set of considerations that guide the Court 
in its determination whether to employ heightened scrutiny: (i) whether the group at issue has 
suffered a history of discrimination; (ii) whether members of the group exhibit obvious 
immutable or distinguishing characteristics that define them as members of a discrete group; (iii) 
whether the group is a minority or politically powerless; and (iv) whether the characteristics 
distinguishing the group have little relation to legitimate policy objectives or to an individual’s 
ability to perform or contribute to society.
183
  
 As discussed, there has been confusion among and within the circuit courts as to the 
appropriate level of review for classifications based on sexual orientation.  Because Golinski was 
a Ninth Circuit case, the DOJ submitted the argument that the rational basis standard used in 
High Tech Gays no longer withstood scrutiny.
184
  It followed that although there existed 
substantial circuit court authority, such as High Tech Gays, that would bind the Golinski court to 
apply rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications, “most of these decisions fail to 
give adequate consideration to [the Court’s considerations].  Indeed, the reasoning of this line of 
                                                        
182
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 3 (footnoting that in neither Romer nor Lawrence did the Court opine on 
the applicability of heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation.  Nor did the Court decide the heightened review issue 
in its one-line per curiam order in Baker v. Nelson, where it dismissed an appeal as of right from a state supreme 
court decision denying marriage status to a same-sex couple.). 
183
 Bowen v. Gilliard, 484 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987); Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
184
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at vi  
To the extent High Tech Gays rested on inferences drawn from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.  186 (1986), that rationale 
does not survive the Supreme Court's subsequent overruling of Bowers in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  To the extent High Tech Gays 
considered the factors the Supreme Court has identified as relevant to the 
inquiry, we respectfully submit that its consideration was incomplete and 
ultimately incorrect. 
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case law traces back to circuit court decisions from the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time when 
[Bowers], was still the law.”185 
i. Whether the Group at Issue has Suffered a History of Discrimination 
 With respect to historic discrimination, homosexuals have been subject to a history of 
discrimination within the United States of America:  There is substantial judicial record to this 
end.  As the Ninth Circuit affirmed in High Tech Gays, “‘[W]e do agree that homosexuals have 
suffered a history of discrimination …’” 186   Similar thoughts were shared by the Court in 
Lawrence, where in overruling Bowers, the Court referenced “colonial laws ordering the death of 
‘any man [that] shall lie with mankind, as he lieth with womankind’ to state laws that, until very 
recently, have ‘demean[ed] the  existence’ of gay and lesbian people ‘by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.’”187  
 Throughout history, homosexuals have been discriminated by all levels of government.  
Discrimination by the federal government dates back to the early 1950s.
188
  During the time of 
World War II, homosexuals in the armed forces were “ferreted” out and removed from the 
military, and were denied benefits if they were found post-military service.
189
  More recently, 
Congress enacted its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which had the effect of repressing the 
                                                        
185
 Id. at 4 (discussing that pursuant to the Court’s overruling Bowers in Lawrence, rational basis review does not 
withstand scrutiny). 
186
 Id. at 6. 
187
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
188
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 6-8 (providing a history of discrimination where federal government 
found homosexuals unfit for federal employment and precluding them from federal employment on the basis of 
sexual orientation, Employment of Homosexuals and Other sex Perverts in Government, Interim Report submitted to 
the Committee by Subcommittee on Investigations pursuant to S. Res. 280 (81
st
 Congress), December 15, 1950, at 9; 
also citing federal government Executive Order 10450, issued by President Eisenhower, which added “sexual 
perversion” as ground for investigation and possible dismissal from federal service, Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 
C.F.R. 936, 938 (1953).  
189
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sexual identity of homosexuals in the armed forces.
190
  Further, Congress prohibited the entry of 
homosexuals into the United States.
191
  And, it was only until the late 1990s that federal agencies 
could no longer discriminate against homosexuals in employment.
192
   
 State and local governments have been equally responsible for historically discriminating 
against homosexuals.
193
  States and localities have discriminated against homosexuals by 
denying them child custody rights based on stereotypes concerning homosexual deviance.
194
 
And, similar justifications have been used in order to preclude homosexuals from public 
employment.
195
 
                                                        
190
 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, PL 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (current version 10 
U.S.C.A. § 654 (2006)), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
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 Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (interpreting the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4), and holding that man who identified as homosexual was 
afflicted with a “psychopathic personality” within terms of the immigration statute excluding such individuals from 
entry into the United States). 
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 Exec. Order No. 13,087 (1998), 63 FR 30097 (1998). 
193
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 9 (discussing history of precluding both homosexuals and homosexual 
school employees from employment in professions requiring state licenses, citing Williams Report, ch. 5 at 18; as 
well as aggressive purging of homosexual employees from government services dating back to the 1940s, Id. at 18-
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194
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 10 (citing Ex parte HH, 830 So. 2d 21,26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., 
concurring) (concurring in denial of custody to lesbian mother on ground that "homosexual conduct is ... abhorrent, 
immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God [and] an 
inherent evil against which children must be protected"); Pulliam v.  Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (N.C.  I 998) 
(upholding denial of custody to a gay man who had a same-sex partner; emphasizing that father engaged in sexual 
acts while unmarried and refused to "counsel the children against such conduct"); Bowen v.  Bowen, 688 So. 2d 
1374, 1381 (Miss.  1997) (holding that a trial court did not err in granting a father custody of his son on the basis 
that people in town had rumored that the son's mother was involved in a lesbian relationship); Bottoms v.  Bottoms, 
457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va.  I995) (noting that, although the Court had previously held "that a lesbian mother is not 
per se an unfit parent," the"[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as  a Class 6 felony in the 
Commonwealth" and therefore "that conduct is another important consideration in determining custody"); Roe v.  
Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692, 694 (Va.  I985) (holding that father, who was in a gay relationship, was "an unfit and 
improper custodian as a matter of law" because of his "continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit 
relationship"). 
195
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 9 (citing Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F.  Supp. 134,138 (N.D. 
Tex.  1981) (holding that police could refuse to hire gays), aff'd without opinion, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.  1982); 
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. I0, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Wash.  1977) (upholding the dismissal of a openly gay 
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Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch., No.5, 512 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir.  1975) (upholding the dismissal of a lesbian 
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 The Court’s decision in Lawrence, lends support a clear history of discrimination because 
the Court recognized that “for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral.”196    
 Private parties have followed suit in discriminating against homosexuals.
197
  National 
statistics demonstrate that homosexuals are continuously among the most repeated victims of 
hate crimes.
198
    
ii. Whether Members Share Immutable of Distinguishing Characteristics 
 With respect to the second consideration, homosexuals as a group exhibit distinguishing 
characteristics.
199
  Judicial opinions evidence contradictions within the circuits as to whether 
homosexuals share characteristics that single them out.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity are immutable,” and that 
“[h]omosexuality is as deeply ingrained as heterosexuality.”200  Subsequently, the same circuit in 
High Tech Gays contradicted this finding when it concluded that sexual orientation is not 
immutable, but instead is behavioral.
201
 
 Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the Ninth Circuit’s judicial interpretations of 
scientific data, the experts in this field are not at a loss for overwhelming consensus that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
teaching position] if there had even been a suspicion that he had violated [the Texas sodomy statute].") rev 'd, 769 
F.2d 289 (5th Cir.  1985) (holding that challenged Texas homosexual sodomy law was constitutional)).  
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 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
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a group has suffered a history of discrimination for purposes of heightened scrutiny application) (citing Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
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199
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illegitimacy.”) (quoting Mathews v.  Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976)).  
200
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 13 (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d I084, I093 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  
201
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 13 (quoting High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 as stating that sexual 
orientation is not immutable because "it is behavioral").  
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homosexuality is an immutable characteristic.
202
 Although homosexuality does not carry any 
obvious or distinguishing characteristic, scientific opinion provides that “most gay people cannot 
change their orientation at will.”203   
 Similarly, the medical community has reached a consensus that efforts by homosexuals to 
change their sexual orientation are “futile and potentially dangerous to an individual’s well-
being.”204  More disconcerting is the argument that homosexuality is defined by a tendency to 
engage in certain conduct.  Such an argument demeans homosexuals in light of the fact that 
many consider their sexual orientation as a fundamental aspect of their identity.
205
  Moreover, the 
Court has rejected such oppositional arguments in Lawrence, and once more in Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, where the Court found that the false distinction between proscribing conduct 
and targeting homosexuals for disparate treatment is meritless.
206
       
 In sum, “[a]s the Court has recognized, sexual orientation is  a core aspect of identity, and 
its expression is an “‘integral part of human freedom.’”207  
iii. Whether Group Constitutes a Minority with Limited Political Power 
 With respect to the third consideration, homosexuals are minorities with limited political 
power.  Notably, recognizing the difficulties in tracking the exact number of homosexuals in the 
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 Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 177 L. Ed. 2d 838 (U.S. 2010). 
207
 Golinski DOJ Brief, supra note 180, at 14 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 576-77). 
    
37 
 
United States, the Williams Institute has accounted for homosexuals comprising a minority of 
3.5 percent of the adult population.
208
 
 The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence suggests that this consideration is the guiding 
principle in protecting groups that are subject to legislative discrimination.
209
  In Rowland v. Mad 
River School District, Justice Brennan’s dissent underscores the history of homosexuals as a 
relatively politically powerless group and the coinciding overlap of historical discrimination.
210
  
 Although the Court has not established any clear guidance on measuring political 
powerlessness, the history of laws that target homosexuals, such as those in Romer and 
Lawrence, indicate that homosexuals have had “limited political power and ‘ability to attract the 
[favorable] attention of the lawmakers’”211   
 Case law has no shortage of litigation concerning the vulnerability of homosexuals to 
discrimination via the democratic process,
212
 and while there have been recent political 
advancements, albeit few, the central inquiry remains “whether they have the strength to 
politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.”213   
 The homosexual community’s lack of political power is undeniably demonstrated by the 
fact that “‘[f]rom 1974 to  1993, at least 21  referendums were held on the sole question of 
whether an existing law or executive order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination should 
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 Id. at 14 (footnoting April 2011 report by the Williams Institute analyzing various data sources, Gary J.  Gates, 
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certiorari). 
211
 Holder letter (quoting Cleburne, 47 3 U.S. at 445). 
212
 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-34; Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (9
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be repealed or retained.  In 15 of these 21 cases, a majority voted to repeal the law or executive 
order.’”214   
 Additionally, recent demonstrations of the political powerlessness of homosexuals is best 
illustrated by the California Supreme Court holding that the state was constitutionally required to 
acknowledge same-sex marriage, and the subsequent passage of Proposition 8, which amended 
the constitution to remove from same-sex couples their once-had right to marry.
215
  Not 
surprisingly, opponents have exercised their overwhelming political power by going so far as to 
target the State judiciary, such as in Iowa, where the voters recalled the three supreme court 
justices who constituted a unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage.
216
  
iv. Whether Classification Bears Rational Relation to Legitimate Policy Objectives 
or Ability to Perform or Contribute to Society 
 Upon finding that a group satisfies heightened scrutiny considerations, the Court may 
nonetheless decline to treat a classification as suspect where the classification relates to the 
groups “’ability to perform or contribute to society.’”217  
 Sexual orientation bears no relation to “impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or 
general social or vocational capabilities.”218  Moreover, the groups’ history of discrimination is 
based not on the societal ineptitude of the homosexual community, but on “invidious and long-
discredited views that gays and lesbians are, for example, sexual deviants or mentally ill.”219  
                                                        
214
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(1995)). 
215
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 The repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”220 coupled with the judicial force of Lawrence 
and Romer lends significant support to the argument that “sexual orientation is not a 
characteristic that generally bears on legitimate policy objectives.” 221   Nor does “sexual 
orientation has no bearing on a person’s ability to ‘cope with and function in the everyday 
world.’”222  
CONCLUSION 
 The Court must establish a clear standard of heightened scrutiny to employ when 
reviewing classifications based on sexual orientation.  As discussed above, the political climate 
has changed and reflects advocacy by the nation, judiciary, and government, for homosexual 
rights.  Moreover, there is urgent need for the Court’s legal stamp of approval on the issue in 
light of inconsistent rulings among and within the lower courts, and most importantly because 
homosexuals as a group satisfy the traditional considerations used by the Court when 
determining whether a classification warrants heightened scrutiny review.    
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